This was a key element of his domestic appeal as an assertive leader who was unashamed of German success. As Germany grew in strength, she began to swallow German speaking lands around her. Meanwhile in the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded and established Italian control of Abyssinia. Chamberlain continued to follow his appeasement until It was only when Hitler reneged on the promise he had given to the British Prime Minister at the Munich Conference — that he would not occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia — that Chamberlain concluded his policy had failed and that the ambitions of dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini could not be quelled.
There were several factors behind this policy. The legacy of the Great War as it came to be known at the time had generated a great reluctance among the public for any form of European conflict, and this manifested in France and Britain not being prepared for war in the s.
France had suffered 1. In the army, consolidation has been the order of the day, but there is clear evidence that a considerable increase is being prepared in the number of divisions and of additional tank units outside those divisions. The air force continues to expand, at an alarming rate, and one can at present see no indication of a halt. We may well soon be faced with a strength of between and first-line aircraft Finally, the mobilisation of the civilian population and industry for war, by means of education, propaganda, training, and administrative measures, has made further strides.
Military efficiency is the god to whom everyone must offer sacrifice. It is not an army, but the whole German nation which is being prepared for war. Eden argued that this move made it even more difficult to get an agreement with Hitler. He was also opposed to further negotiations with Benito Mussolini about withdrawing from its involvement in the Spanish Civil War. Eden stated that he completely "mistrusted" the Italian leader. At a Cabinet meeting Chamberlain made it clear that he was unwilling to back down over the issue.
Anthony Eden resigned on 20th February He told the House of Commons the following day: "I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure. I am certain in my own mind that progress depends above all on the temper of the nation, and that temper must find expression in a firm spirit.
This spirit I am confident is there. Not to give voice it is I believe fair neither to this country nor to the world. Major George Joseph Ball persuaded the BBC to relegate Eden's resignation to the second story on the evenings bulletins and to say nothing at all about Germany or Italy.
The Daily Mail reported: "The country will be relieved to learn that Mr. Eden resigned from the Government last night. Eden's policy during his two years as Foreign Secretary has produced uncertainty at home and bewilderment abroad. The Daily Mail has never seen eye to eye with him. It is to be hoped that in his future political career he will profit by his experiences and mistakes.
Above all, the country is fortunate in having a Prime Minister to whom it can give its fullest confidence - a statesman who handles the nation's affairs, both domestic and foreign, with realism and sound common sense.
Health reasons have played their part. One of Mr. Eden's colleagues said to me last night: 'Mr. Eden was overwrought this weekend, and there is no doubt that his condition was the culmination of months of strain and hardwork' ". Ball now attempted to undermine Eden by suggesting he was a homosexual and that while he was at university he had attempted to seduce Eddie Gathorne-Hardy. As a result of these relationships his marriage to Beatrice Beckett was in difficulty and she was having affairs with other men.
Despite this Eden was able to attract sizeable support in the country, despite the Government's manipulation of the media. The cheering crowds outside Eden's London home reflected the reaction of many people. According to an opinion poll conducted that month by the British Institute of Public Opinion, fully 71 per cent thought Eden was right to resign, while only 19 per cent thought he should have stayed on.
When asked whether they favoured "Mr Chamberlain's foreign policy", only 26 per cent said that they did, against 58 per cent who did not. No one else in the Cabinet was willing to resign over this issue: Winston Churchill commented: "There seemed one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender, or wrong measurements and feeble impulses.
He seemed at this moment to embody the life-hope of the British nation… Now he was gone. The only thing they cared about was their property and their cash. The only thing they feared was that one day those nasty Communists would come and take it. Churchill argued in Parliament that: "The resignation of the late Foreign Secretary may well be a milestone in history. Great quarrels, it has been well said, arise from small occasions but seldom from small causes. The late Foreign Secretary adhered to the old policy which we have all forgotten for so long.
The Prime Minister and his colleagues have entered upon another and a new policy. The old policy was an effort to establish the rule of law in Europe, and build up through the League of Nations effective deterrents against the aggressor. Is it the new policy to come to terms with the totalitarian Powers in the hope that by great and far-reaching acts of submission, not merely in sentiment and pride, but in material factors, peace may be preserved. He claimed it was wrong for The Times to suggest that Eden had resigned because of ill-health.
Quite the contrary, he argued, Eden had taken the decision to resign "in the full possession of his powers and faculties, and Cartland admitted that he could not support Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and at the end of the debate he joined twenty other Tory MPs in abstaining. David Low , a cartoonist who opposed appeasement, commented: "As might have been expected in such conditions, advocates of Churchill-Eden and opponents of appeasement soon found themselves labeled war-mongers and irresponsibles.
On 12th March, , the German Army invaded Austria. The country had been due to hold a referendum on its independence in which, it was expected, it would vote against incorporation into the Third Reich. The union with Austria was achieved by bullying and intimidation, but without a single shot being fired. Chamberlain was shocked and dismayed but felt he had to accept Anschluss.
He told the cabinet that they now had to "prevent an occurrence of similar events in Czechoslovakia". Winston Churchill, like the Government and most of his fellow Conservative MPs, decided that they would have to accept the aggressive action taken by Hitler.
During the debate in the House of Commons , Churchill did not advocate the use of force to remove German forces from Austria. Instead he called for was discussion between diplomats at Geneva and still continued to support the government's appeasement policy. According to John Bew , there were political reasons for this approach and why Clement Attlee led the attack on Chamberlain's decision not to take action over Austria. The majority of his party remained firmly behind Chamberlain. In public, Churchill had in fact begun to temper his criticism of the government, in the hope that he might be brought back into office in some capacity, and be able to exert his influence from within.
It was Attlee Chamberlain now appointed fellow appeaser, Lord Halifax , as his new foreign secretary.
Hitler's main concern was over Czechoslovakia, a country that had been created after the allied victory in the First World War. Before the conflict it had been part of the Austrian-Hungarian empire. In March , Adolf Hitler advised Konrad Henlein , the leader of the Sudeten Germans, on his political campaign to gain independence. Hitler told him "that demands should be made by the Sudeten German Party which are unacceptable to the Czech government.
Later that month, Hugh Christie , an MI6 agent, working in Nazi Germany, told headquarters that Hitler would be ousted by the military if Britain joined forces with Czechoslovakia against Germany. Christie warned that the "crucial question is: How soon will the next step against Czechoslovakia be tried?
The probability is that the delay will not exceed two or three months at most, unless France and England provide the deterrent, for which cooler heads in Germany are praying. Chamberlain believed his appeasement policy was very popular with the British people.
Bennett , that Chamberlain was "the best P. However, some members of his cabinet found him a difficult man. He became suspicious to the point of paranoia, employing Sir Joseph Ball , with the support of MI5 , to gather information on the contacts and financial arrangements of his political opponents, and even to intercept their telephone calls. Eden replied that Chamberlain was attempting to "return to class warfare in its bitterest form".
The Czech crisis reached the first of many dangerous points in May It was reported that two Sudeten German motorcyclists had been shot dead by the Czech police. This led to rumours of Hitler preparing to use the incident as a pretext for invasion and there were reports of German troops assembling near the Czech border.
The French and Soviet governments pledged support to the Czechs. Lord Halifax sent a message to Berlin which warned that if force was used Germany "could not count upon this country being able to stand aside".
At the same time he sent a diplomatic message which told the French they should not assume Britain would fight to save Czechoslovakia.
On 25th May, Lord Halifax had a meeting Tomas Masaryk , the Czechoslovak minister in London, and told him the least that his country could "get away with" would be autonomy on "the Swiss model" combined with neutrality in foreign policy. Later that day Chamberlain told the Cabinet "the Sudeten Deutsch should remain in Czechoslovakia but as contented people. Winston Churchill now decided to become involved in discussions with representatives of Hitler's government in Nazi Germany in an attempt to avoid conflict between the two nations.
Forster asked Churchill whether German discriminatory legislation against the Jews would prevent an understanding with Britain. Churchill replied that he thought "it was a hindrance and an irritation, but probably not a complete obstacle to a working agreement. On the suggestion of Lord Halifax it was decided to send Lord Runciman , to Czechoslovakia to investigate the Sudeten claims for self-determination.
He arrived in Prague on 4th August , and over the next few days he saw all the major figures involved in the dispute within Czechoslovakia.
He became extremely sympathetic to the Sudeten desire for home rule. In his report he placed the major share of the blame for the breakdown of talks on the Czech government and recommended that the Sudeten Germans be allowed the opportunity to join the Third Reich.
Neville Henderson supported Runciman and told Chamberlain: "However, badly Germany behaves does not make the rights of the Sudeten any less justifiable. Kleist-Schmenzin argued that only a strong Anglo-French line would force Hitler to back down. Chamberlain rejected these views because they conflicted with his own view that open threats of force would hasten the outbreak of war.
On 12th September, , Hitler whipped his supporters into a frenzy at the annual Nuremberg Rally by claiming the Sudeten Germans were "not alone" and would be protected by Nazi Germany. A series of demonstrations took place in the Sudeten area and on 13th September, the Czech government decided to introduce martial law in the area. Konrad Henlein , the leader of the Sudeten Germans, fled to Germany for protection.
Chamberlain now sent Hitler a message requesting an immediate meeting, which was promptly granted. Hitler invited Chamberlain to see him at his home in Berchtesgaden. It would be the first visit by a British prime minister to Germany for over 60 years. The last leader to visit the country was Benjamin Disraeli when he attended the Congress of Berlin in Members of the Czech government were horrified when they heard the news as they feared Chamberlain would accept Hitler's demands for the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany.
On 15th September, , Chamberlain, aged sixty-nine, boarded a Lockheed Electra aircraft for a seven-hour journey to Munich, followed by a three-hour car ride up the long and winding roads to Berchtesgaden. The first meeting lasted for three hours. Hitler made it very clear that he intended to "stop the suffering" of the Sudeten Germans by force. Chamberlain asked Hitler what was required for a peaceful solution. Hitler demanded the transfer of all districts in Czechoslovakia with a 50 per cent or more German-speaking population.
Chamberlain said he had nothing against the idea in principle, but would need to overcome "practical difficulties". Hitler flattered Chamberlain and this had the desired impact on him. He told his sister: "Horace Wilson heard from various people who were with Hitler after my interview that he had been very favourably impressed. I have had a conversation with a man, he said, and one with whom I can do business and he liked the rapidity with which I had grasped the essentials.
In short I had established a certain confidence, which was my aim, and in spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word. Chamberlain called an emergency cabinet meeting on 17th September. Duff Cooper , First Lord of the Admiralty, recorded in his diary: "Looking back upon what he said, the curious thing seems to me now to have been that he recounted his experiences with some satisfaction.
Although he said that at first sight Hitler struck him as 'the commonest little dog' he had ever seen, without one sign of distinction, nevertheless he was obviously pleased at the reports he had subsequently received of the good impression that he himself had made.
He told us with obvious satisfaction how Hitler had said to someone that he had felt that he, Chamberlain, was 'a man. None of the elaborate schemes which had been so carefully worked out, and which the Prime Minister had intended to put forward, had ever been mentioned.
He had felt that the atmosphere did not allow of them. After ranting and raving at him, Hitler had talked about self-determination and asked the Prime Minister whether he accepted the principle.
The Prime Minister had replied that he must consult his colleagues. From beginning to end Hitler had not shown the slightest sign of yielding on a single point. The Prime Minister seemed to expect us all to accept that principle without further discussion because the time was getting on. Chamberlain told the cabinet that he was convinced "that Herr Hitler was telling the truth".
Thomas Inskip , Minister for Coordination of Defence, and a loyal supporter of Chamberlain, felt uneasy by the prime minister's performance. He recorded in his diary: "The impression made by the P. It was plain that Hitler had made all the running: he had in fact blackmailed the P. Oliver Stanley , President of the Board of Trade objected vigorously to Hitler's "ultimatum", and declared that "if the choice for the Government in the next four days is between surrender and fighting, we ought to fight".
Herbrand Sackville , 9th Earl De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, said he was "prepared to face war in order to free the world from the continual threat of ultimatums". Douglas Hogg , 1st Viscount Hailsham, attempted to rally the cabinet to Chamberlain's cause with the defeatist statement that he thought that we "had no alternative but to submit to humiliation.
It was Duff Cooper who was Chamberlain's harshest critic and wrote in his diary: "I argued that the main interest of this country had always been to prevent any one Power from obtaining undue predominance in Europe; but we were now faced with probably the most formidable Power that had ever dominated Europe, and resistance to that Power was quite obviously a British interest. If I thought surrender would bring lasting peace I should be in favour of surrender, but I did not believe there would ever be peace in Europe so long as Nazism ruled in Germany.
The next act of aggression might be one that it would be far harder for us to resist. Supposing it was an attack on one of our Colonies. We shouldn't have a friend in Europe to assist us, nor even the sympathy of the United States which we had today. We certainly shouldn't catch up the Germans in rearmament. On the contrary, they would increase their lead. However, despite all the arguments in favour of taking a strong stand now, which would almost certainly lead to war, I was so impressed by the fearful responsibility of incurring a war that might possibly be avoided, that I thought it worth while to postpone it in the very faint hope that some internal event might bring about the fall of the Nazi regime.
But there were limits to the humiliation I was prepared to accept. Chamberlain ignored his critics and without taking a vote he insisted the Cabinet had "accepted the principle of self-determination and given him the support he had asked for". Chamberlain claimed that his policy was very popular with the public and that he would love to show his colleagues "some of the many letters which he had received in the last few days, which showed the intense feeling of relief throughout the country, and of thankfulness and gratitude for the load which had been lifted, at least temporarily.
In the hour-and-a-half meeting, the men were highly critical of the government. Citrine pointed out that "British prestige had been gravely lowered by Chamberlain going to see Hitler. Dalton suggested that these were unlikely to be the last of Hitler's demands. After the meeting Dalton wrote a scathing assessment of Chamberlain: "The best that can be said of the P.
If Hitler had been a British nobleman and Chamberlain a British working man with an inferiority complex, the thing could not have been done better. On 18th September, , Chamberlain and several of his ministers, met Edouard Daladier , the prime minister of France, in order to persuade him to agree to the orderly transfer of the Sudeten areas to Germany.
Chamberlain said that unless we accept Hitler's demands, "we must expect that Herr Hitler's reply would be to give the order to march". According to Sir John Simon , the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Daladier was overwhelmed by the emotional strain of attempting both to fulfil France's treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time avoiding war at any cost. Daladier admitted that the dilemma he faced was "to discover some means of preventing France from being forced into war as a result of her obligations and at the same time to preserve Czechoslovakia and save as much of that country as was humanly possible.
Daladier told Chamberlain the French would agree to support Hitler's demands only in return for a British agreement to join the French alliance system in protecting other countries in eastern Europe, including guaranteeing what was left of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain now had to sell the idea to the Cabinet. He faced a hostile reception to the idea and several members were very unhappy with the proposed guarantee to Czechoslovakia.
What precise obligations did it entail? Was it to be a "joint" guarantee, to be implemented only when each and every guarantor wished to enforce it, or was it to be a "several" guarantee, meaning that in theory Britain could be called on to defend Czechoslovakia alone? Even the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax , also found it difficult to defend. He conceded that he too "felt considerable misgivings about the guarantee, but Leslie Hore-Belisha , Secretary of State for War, was the most vociferous in voicing his concerns, principally on the strategic grounds that Czechoslovakia could not be defended.
Once the Sudeten German areas had been transferred, it would become "an unstable State economically, would be strategically unsound, and there was no means by which we could implement the guarantee. It was difficult to see how it could survive. Samuel Hoare , the Home Secretary, was given the task of persuading the newspapers to support Chamberlain's plan.
He began to hold daily meetings with proprietors and editors. Layton agreed to help and when one of his young journalists returned from Prague with a secret document which revealed the detailed timetable for the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, he arranged for the story to be suppressed.
Vernon Bartlett had his articles censored and when the newspaper editor, Gerald Barry , wrote an anti-Chamberlain leader, Layton sacked him. Sir Horace Wilson , a senior civil servant who worked closely with Chamberlain, was given the task of controlling the way appeasement was reported on the BBC.
A subsequent internal BBC report on the meetings between Hitler and Chamberlain in , revealed that "towards the end of August, when the international situation was daily growing more critical", Wilson made a number of veiled threats. The report also confirmed that "news bulletins as a whole inevitably fell into line with Government policy at this critical juncture. Paramount News released a newsreel featuring interviews with two senior British journalists who were critical of Chamberlain.
British cinema audiences greeted "with considerable applause" the warning that "Germany is marching to a diplomatic triumph Our people have not been told the truth. Kennedy brought his influence to bear on Paramount's American holding company, and the offending newsreel was quickly withdrawn.
On 19th September, , Clement Attlee had a meeting with Neville Chamberlain about the negotiations with Hitler and demanded the recall of Parliament to discuss the crisis. Later that day the National Council of Labour issued a statement saying that it viewed "with dismay the reported proposals of the British and French Governments for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia under the brutal threat of armed force by Nazi Germany and without prior consultation with the Czechoslovak Government.
It declares that this is a shameful betrayal of a peaceful and democratic people and constitutes a dangerous precedent for the future. Some newspapers became hostile to the government's policy towards the Sudetenland. The Daily Herald commented angrily that the Czechs had been "betrayed and deserted by those who had given every assurance that there should be no dismembership of their country".
Conservative MPs also began to criticize the proposed deal. Anthony Eden told a constituency meeting that the "British people know that a stand must be made. They pray that it will not be made too late.
The partition of Czechoslovakia under Anglo-French pressure amounts to a complete surrender by the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force. Chamberlain did receive support from the Duke of Windsor , the former King Edward VIII, and considered someone who was pro-Nazi: "I would wish to express on behalf of the Duchess and myself, our very sincere admiration for the courageous manner in which you threw convention and precedent to the winds by seeking a personal meeting with Herr Hitler and flying to Germany.
It was a bold step to take, but if I may so, one after my own heart, as I have always believed in personal contact as the best policy in a tight corner. Meanwhile the German government continuing to put pressure on Chamberlain to make a decision. Joseph Goebbels mounted a propaganda campaign against the Czech government. German newspapers claimed that women and children were mowed down by Czech armoured cars and that poison gas had been used against German-speaking demonstrators.
They discussed the issue for two days before issuing a statement rejecting the Anglo-French plan. Acceptance of the proposals would be unconstitutional, and would lead to the "complete mutilation of the Czechoslovak State in every respect". The statement also reminded the British and French about their own treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia.
He claimed that: "We had no other choice because we were left alone. Let us have confidence in ourselves. Let us believe in the genius of our nation. We shall not surrender, we shall hold the land of our fathers. The following morning there was a general strike in Prague, and an even larger mass demonstration.
Over , people demanded a military government, and a programme of national resistance. That evening the Czech government resigned. I may soon call upon you here to take an active part in the defence of our country in which we all going to join. Maxim Litvinov , the Soviet foreign minister, told the assembly of the United Nations that the Soviet Union intended to fulfil its obligations towards Czechoslovakia, if France would do the same.
Chamberlain arrived in Godesberg on 22nd September. At their first meeting Hitler made a series of new demands. He now wanted the immediate occupation of Sudeten areas and non-German-speakers who wished to leave would be allowed to take only a single suitcase of belongings with them. He also added to his demands certain areas with less than 50 per cent German speakers. He also raised Polish and Hungarian grievances in other areas of Czechoslovakia. At another meeting the following day Chamberlain pleaded with him to return to the terms of the previous agreement.
Chamberlain pointed out that he had already risked his entire political reputation to gain the Anglo-French plan and if he marched into the Sudetenland, his political career would be destroyed. He pointed out that when he left England he had been booed by the crowd at the airport. Hitler refused to budge and restated that he would occupy the Sudeten areas on 1st October.
Chamberlain decided to break-off talks and return to London. Chamberlain had been right by the changing public mood in Britain. A Mass Observation poll found that 44 per cent of those questioned expressed themselves to be "indignant" at Chamberlain's policy, while only 18 per cent were supportive. Of those men who were questioned, 67 per cent said they were willing to fight to defend Czechoslovakia. On the day that he returned to London, a crowd of over 10, people massed in Whitehall, shouting "Stand by the Czechs!
Alexander Cadogan , Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, felt that it would be impossible for the Cabinet to support Chamberlain in his efforts to do a deal with Hitler.
When he read Hitler's latest memorandum which laid out his demands he thought Chamberlain would advise the Cabinet to reject it. He was shocked when he discovered that Chamberlain wanted to accept these terms. He was quite calmly for total surrender Hitler has evidently hypnotised him. On 24th September the Cabinet had a full-day meeting. Chamberlain told his ministers that he was "satisfied Herr Hitler would not go back on his word" and was not using the crisis as an excuse to "crush Czechoslovakia or dominate Europe.
He thought that he had now established an influence over Herr Hitler, and the latter trusted him. The Prime Minister believed that Herr Hitler was speaking the truth. Chamberlain had now lost the support of most of his Cabinet. Leslie Hore-Belisha , Secretary of State for War, rejected Hitler's proposal, and called for the army to be mobilised.
It was, he contended, "the only argument Hitler would understand". He then warned that the Cabinet "would never be forgiven if there were a sudden attack on us and we had failed to take the proper steps. He was always concerned that the government would achieve "peace with dishonour", now he feared "war with dishonour". Cooper pointed out the chiefs of staff had already called for mobilisation - "we might some day have to explain why we had disregarded their advice.
Cooper commented that it was "difficult to deny that any such danger existed". In his diary that night Cooper wrote: "Hitler has cast a spell over Neville". Lord Halifax , the Foreign Secretary, the great supporter of appeasement, was now having doubts about the policy. He wrote to Chamberlain explaining: "It may help you if we give you some indication of what seems predominant public opinion as expressed in press and elsewhere.
While mistrustful of our plan but prepared perhaps to accept it with reluctance as alternative to war, great mass of public opinion seems to be hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to limit of concession and that it is up to Chancellor Hitler to make some contribution. Earl Winterton went to see Leo Amery , one of Chamberlain's oldest friends, and someone who was felt to have influence over the prime minister. He admitted that "at least four of five Cabinet members were seriously contemplating resignation.
Amery also wrote a letter to Chamberlain, which he delivered himself. How, he asked, could Chamberlain expect the Czechs "to commit such an act of folly and cowardice? Amery concluded the letter with the words: "If the country and the House should once suppose that you were prepared to acquiesce in or even endorse this latest demand, there would be a tremendous feeling of revulsion against you. Chamberlain's main concern was the changing views of Lord Halifax.
At a Cabinet meeting on 25th September, he admitted he said that he no longer trusted Hitler: "He Halifax could not rid his mind of the fact that Herr Hitler had given us nothing and that he was dictating terms, just as though he had won a war but without having had to fight So long as Nazism lasted, peace would be uncertain.
For this reason he did not think it would be right to put pressure on Czechoslovakia to accept. Duff Cooper wrote in his diary that Halifax's comments "came as a great surprise to those who think as I do. Douglas Hogg , 1st Viscount Hailsham, previously a staunch ally of Chamberlain, produced a press cutting which listed in detail the many occasions on which Hitler had broken his word. Only two ministers supported Chamberlain, James Stanhope , the President of the Board of Education, and Kingsley Wood , the Secretary of State for Air, who argued that the prime minister's visits had "made a considerable impression in Germany and had probably done more to weaken Nazism than any other event in recent years.
Neville Henderson , the British ambassador in Germany, pleaded with Chamberlain to go on negotiating with Hitler. He believed that the German claim to the Sudetenland in was a moral one, and he always reverted in his dispatches to his conviction that the Treaty of Versailles had been unfair to Germany.
Henderson thought, not unreasonably, that it was not the job of the British government to subvert the German government". Chamberlain also received support from Sir Eric Phipps , the British ambassador to France: "Unless German aggression were so brutal, bloody and prolonged as to infuriate French public opinion to the extent of making it lose its reason, war now would be most unpopular in France.
I think therefore that His Majesty's Government should realise extreme danger of even appearing to encourage small, but noisy and corrupt, war group here. All that is best in France is against war, almost at any price.
Daladier retorted that a meeting of his Council of Ministers that afternoon had unanimously rejected the Godesberg demands. Chamberlain asked if this meant France would declare war on Germany? Daladier replied that "in the event of unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, France would fulfil her obligations".
The Czechoslovak government leaked details of the Godesberg demands to the British press. The Times included a statement from Leo Amery , attacking Chamberlain: "Are we to surrender to ruthless brutality a free people whose cause we have espoused but are now to throw to the wolves to save our own skins, or are we still able to stand up to a bully. Harold Macmillan , the Conservative MP, who had been a critic of the government's appeasement policy, later explained the mood of the British people at the time: "They were grimly, but quietly and soberly, making up their minds to face war.
They had been told that the devastation of air attack would be beyond all imagination. They had been led to expect civilian casualties on a colossal scale. They knew, in their hearts, that our military preparations were feeble and inadequate. Yet they faced their ordeal with calm and dignity We thought of air warfare in , rather as people think of nuclear warfare today.
Benito Mussolini suggested to Hitler that one way of solving this issue was to hold a four-power conference of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. This would exclude both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and therefore increasing the possibility of reaching an agreement and undermine the solidarity that was developing against Germany.
On 28th September, , Hitler announced he would settle the matter peacefully at a conference to be held at Munich, beginning the next day.
Masaryk tried to insist that his country should be represented in these talks. However, he was told that Hitler had only agreed to the conference on condition that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were excluded.
Masaryk replied: "If you have sacrificed my nation to preserve the peace of world, I will be the first to applaud you. But if not, gentlemen, God help your souls. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.
Appeasement is the foreign policy tactic of offering specific concessions to an aggressor nation in order to prevent war. Usually viewed as a policy of offering substantial concessions to more powerful dictatorial totalitarian and fascist governments, the wisdom and effectiveness of appeasement has been a source of debate since it failed to prevent World War II.
In the early s, the lingering trauma of World War I cast appeasement in a positive light as a useful peacekeeping policy. Indeed, it seemed a logical means of satisfying the demand for isolationism , prevalent in the U. However, since the failure of the Munich Agreement, the cons of appeasement have outnumbered its pros.
While appeasement has the potential to prevent war, history has shown it rarely does so. Finally, appeasement is often viewed as an act of cowardice by the public and taken as a sign of military weakness by the aggressor nation. The delays of the appeasement are thought to be at least partially to blame for allowing pre-World War II atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking and the Holocaust.
Perhaps the best-known example of appeasement took place on September 30, , when leaders of Great Britain, France, and Italy signed the Munich Agreement allowing Nazi Germany to annex the German-speaking Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. In response, the League and the U. The U. Japan, however, rejected all offers of appeasement and went on to invade and occupy the whole of Manchuria.
Today, many historians assert that this lack of opposition actually encouraged European aggressors to undertake similar invasions. Since the late s Iran had been suspected of using its nuclear power program as a cover for developing nuclear weapons.
However, in May , President Donald Trump , citing evidence that Iran had covertly revived its nuclear weapons program, withdrew the U. Actively scan device characteristics for identification.
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